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SYNOPSIS
The purpose of this Article is to examine the European Union's
exercise of jurisdiction over mergers that take place between companies
located outside of the European Union. It looks at the possibility that the
European Union's approval or disapproval of such mergers depends not
only on the possible anticompetitive effects of the merger and, by
implication, the negative effects to the consumers within the European
Union, but also the protection of the national champion of the European
Union, the aerospace industry. In addition, the European Union helps the
aerospace industry within the European Union by granting subsidies that
violate European Union competition laws, United States antitrust laws,
and treaties that the European Union has entered into with other nations.
INTRODUCTION
In order to determine whether the European Union ("E.U.") is
favoring European undertakings,' it is first essential to have an
J.D., University of Oklahoma; LL.M. International Law and Business, Stetson
University College of Law. The author would like to thank Professor Mark
Bauer and Amy Thompson, Esq. for their assistance with this work. The author
can be reached at jasondt@comcast.net or 941-323-2322.
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understanding of the merger guidelines of the E.U..2 The E.U.
promulgated the "Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers
under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between
undertakings." 3 The chief question to be answered by E.U. officials
when evaluating a possible merger4 of two businesses, or undertakings, is
whether the merger would significantly impede competition, or
particularly, whether the merger would strengthen a dominant position in
the common market.5 It is important to note that the language of the E.U.
regulation discusses the effect of the merger on the "common market"
and makes no reference to the location of the companies attempting to
complete the merger.
6
The most common reason to deny a merger between
undertakings is that the merger would be harmful to competition by
strengthening the dominant position of a single firm. 7  The E.U.
Competition Commission ("Competition Commission") assesses the
competitive effects of the merger by considering the competitive
conditions that will result after the merger compared with the conditions
without the merger. 8 The Competition Commission states that it uses
two means in reviewing a potential merger:9 the current market shares in
1 Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers Under the Council
Regulation on the Control of concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J.
(C 31/03) 5, 5, available at http://europa.E.U..int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/c_031/c_03120040205en00050018.pdf [hereinafter
Guidelines]. "Undertakings" is the term that the European Union uses to refer to
businesses. Throughout this Article, business and undertakings may be use
interchangeably.
2 Cf http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm (outlining the United States'
horizontal merger guidelines as a means of comparison).
3 Guidelines, supra note 1.
4 See generally EUROPA, EUROJARGON, at
http://europa.E.U..int/scadplus/glossary/merger en.htm (last visited Apr. 10,
2006). In addition to using the term mergers the European Union also refers to
mergers as "concentrations."
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its competitive analysis,' ° and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index" in its
determination of concentration levels. 12 The E.U. views a market share
of over fifty percent or more as evidence of the existence of a dominant
position on the part of a particular undertaking.' 3  The Competition
Commission has also determined that some undertakings with less than
forty percent of the market share hold a dominant position.'
4
The real issue and the purpose of this Article is to focus on the
E.U. and its exercise of jurisdiction in extraterritorial mergers. No one
denies or argues with the E.U.'s authority and jurisdiction to control the
mergers of undertakings located within the territorial bounds of the
E.U..15 The issues exist when the principals to the merger are located
outside of the territory of the E.U..
The E.U. takes the position that mergers are within the
jurisdiction of the E.U. even if the principals are not located within the
territorial bounds of the E.U.. The Competition Commission relies on
the Merger Regulation' 6 to find jurisdiction for the review of mergers
10 Id.
l" Id.
12 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTIRUST POLICY THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 12.4a2, at 2 (2d ed.1999). The Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index ("HHI") is used by the enforcement agencies within the
United States to measure market concentration. The HHI is determined by
computing the sum of the squares of the market share of the companies in a
particular market. A market with an HHI in excess of 1800 is considered to be
highly concentrated. For example, in a market containing 3 firms with one firm
holding thirty-four percent and the other two each holding thirty-three percent of
the market share the HHI would be 3,334. By comparison, a market with 20
firms, each holding five percent of the market share, would have an HHI of 500.
13Guidelines, supra note 1, at 7.
14 id.
15 This is subject to the limitations mandating that the member states of the E.U.
have exclusive jurisdiction, which is beyond the scope of this Article.
16 Council Regulation 139/04 of 20 January 2004 on the control of
concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), art. 1, 2004





between companies that are foreign to the E.U.. 17  The Merger
Regulation applies to all mergers that have a community dimension,
explained below.' 8 The Merger Regulation does not specify where the
merger must occur or where the location of the undertakings must be in
order for the E.U. to have jurisdiction over the merger, thus leaving a
gray area in the jurisdiction.' 9 The Competition Commission therefore
takes the position that if a proposed merger meets the definition of a
concentration that will have an impact on the E.U., then the Competition
Commission gives no regard to the location of the parties.20
According to the Competition Commission, the only relevant
factor is whether the activities of the companies have a community
dimension in that the merger will affect the E.U..21 This broad definition
of community dimension gives the E.U. jurisdiction no matter where the
companies are located and whether the companies have a presence within
the boundaries of the E.U. .22 This, of course, raises the question of how
the E.U. can review mergers that occur outside of the boundaries of the
E.U. between companies that are located in and do all of their
manufacturing in another country, such as the U.S., and not violate
treaties.
Business is becoming more and more global, and companies are
seeing more of an opportunity to increase profits through the
implementation of selling to other countries. Some companies choose to
locate in another country through the presence of a wholly owned
subsidiary. Other companies choose to remain in the home country and
to simply export goods into another state or country. The U.S. and the
E.U. have entered into an agreement 23 whereby the two entities agree on
17 David J. Feeney, The European Commission's Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Over Corporate Mergers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 425, 430 (2002).
18 id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 431.
21 Ariel Ezrachi, Limitations on the Extraterritorial Reach of the European
Merger Regulation, 22 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 137, 138 (2001).
22 Id.
23 Agreement Between the European Communities and the Government of the
United States of America on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the
[VOL. 14:2
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the enforcement of competition laws through comity. 24 If this is the case,
one must then wonder: how can the two entities clash regarding
mergers?
Although the agreement is intended to create a cooperative
relationship between the US and the E.U. in order to avoid a clash of
laws, the agreement specifically excludes the area of review of
mergers.2 5 Because of this exclusion in the agreement, the US and the
EU. 26 can review the exact same merger and reach a different
determination as to whether the proposed merger will have a negative
effect on competition.
In 2002, the Economic and Social Committee ("Committee") of
the E.U. released an opinion regarding competition rules relative to
27mergers. The Committee stated that since the time the merger
regulation came into effect, approximately 2,000 proposed
concentrations have been notified to the Competition Commission. 28 Of
the 2,000 notifications of mergers, the Competition Commission blocked
eighteen and approximately 150 received clearance after concessions
from the companies planning to merge.2 9 Although the Committee stated
that the ultimate goal of competition law is to protect consumer
Enforcement of Competition Laws, 1998 O.J. (L 173) 28, 28 [hereinafter
Agreement on Comity Principles].
24 Id., art. III, at 29. Comity is the balancing of the local law against the interest
of a foreign state's laws in determining whether jurisdiction is proper. See, e.g.,
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, (9th Cir. 1976).
But see, e.g., Jaafar A. Riazi, Finding Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Antitrust
Claims of Extraterritorial Origin: Whether the Seventh Circuit's Approach
Properly Balances Policies of International Comity and Deterrence, 54 DEPAUL
L. REv. 1277 (2005).
25 Agreement on Comity Principles, supra note 23, art. II, at 29; Feeney, supra
note 17, at 429-30.
26 See generally Andre Fiebig, Modernization of European Competition Law as
a Form of Convergence, 19 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 63 (2005).
27 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the 'Green Paper on the
Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89,' 2002 O.J. (C 241/25) 130,




interests,30 the Committee also articulated that, "merger control should be
considered within the context of the global economy, in order to take
account of the steadily rising international competitive pressure on
European companies." 3 1 The Committee also noted that protection of
European companies is needed to facilitate growth of companies of the
E.U., and that policies must evolve to allow European companies to be
competitive on a global level.32
I. THE PURPOSE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The E.U. is a group of countries located within Europe that
joined together in 1957 in an effort to provide a single market.33 In
addition to the stated humanitarian goals of the E.U. is the goal of being
a viable economic competitor on the world stage.34 Although not so
stated, one of the primary purposes of the E.U. is to allow countries that
are a part of the E.U. to compete with the U.S.. The gross national
product of the U.S. is approximately $12 trillion,35 whereas the gross
national product of the E.U. is approximately $8 trillion.36 Although no
one country within the E.U. has the necessary power to compete with the
U.S. economically, the E.U., as a group, does have that power.
II. THE NATIONAL CHAMPION THEORY
The theory of a national champion is that a country will have a
particular company that will compete with companies from another
30Id. at 132.
" Id. at 131.
32ld. at 135.
33 EUROPA, THE E.U. AT A GLANCE-THE HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
at http://europa.E.U..int/abc/history/index-en.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2006).
34 id.
35 WORLD BANK, TOTAL GNI 2004, ATLAS METHOD 4 (Jul. 15, 2005),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNI.pdf.36 id.
[VOL. 14:2316
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country. 37  The national champion will generally fall to a large
multinational corporation that competes on a global level in a certain
area of manufactured goods. The theory of a national champion is
twofold. First, the national champion may receive preferential treatment
from the local government in the application of antitrust laws.38 Second,
the country or governing body in the case of governmental organizations
will act in a manner that is detrimental to competing companies from
other countries in favor of the national champion. 39 This favoritism
causes concern because acting in such a manner can not only be
anticompetitive in that it is not necessarily in the best interest of
consumers to support the national champion, but also because it can
result in a political disaster as a result of the perceived harm caused to
another sovereign.
This favoritism is most commonly seen in the context of
mergers. Sovereigns have a vested interest in protecting their national
champion as well as in exerting political pressure. 40 The argument can
(and will herein) be made that Airbus is the National Champion of the
E.U.. Beyond Airbus, the E.U.'s preference seems to extend to the
37 See generally Paul B. Stephan, Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits
of International Cooperation, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 173 (2005) (discussing
national regulation in cross-border transactions).
38 Andrew Guzman, The Case for International Antirust, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L




40 See generally EUR. COMM'N, STAR 21-STRATEGIC AEROSPACE REVIEW FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY 4 (2002), available at
http://europa.E.U..int/comm/enterprise/aerospace/report star2 1 screen.pdf
[hereinafter STAR 21 REPORT] (setting out the Aerospace Advisory Group's
analysis and recommendations for creating a coherent market and policy
framework). The European Advisory Group on Aerospace produced the STAR
21 report. The Group was made up of seven aerospace industry chairmen, five
European Commissioners, the E.U. High Representative for the Common
Foreign and Security Policy and two Members of the European Parliament.
Also among the members of the group were two co-chairmen of EADS, the
chairman of BAE Systems and the chairman of Rolls-Royce.
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aeronautical industry itself, making the industry as a whole the national
champion, instead ofjust Airbus.
The E.U. has a stated policy to lean towards companies that are a
part of the E.U. in the aeronautical industry. The E.U. Competition
Commission has stated that the E.U. has a position leaning towards E.U.
undertakings in the aerospace industry.4' The Competition Commission
responded to the STAR 21 Report in 2003.42 In this report, the E.U.
Competition Commission communicated with the Council, the European
Parliament, The European Economic and Social Committee, and the
Committee of the Regions.43
The Competition Commission began by stating that the
aerospace industry within the E.U. plays a central role in the overall
quality of life within the E.U., including, without limitation,
transportation, communication, observation, security and defense. 4 The
Competition Commission also highlighted that a "globally competitive
aerospace industry is central to the achievement of Europe's economic
and political objectives. '4 According to the Competition Commission,
Europe needed to build an environment in which the aerospace industry
would be encouraged to retain and improve its competitiveness in order
to contribute to the E.U.'s ultimate goals.46 As a result, the Competition
Commission formed the Aerospace Advisory Group to consider and
review the political and regulatory framework for the aerospace industry
in Europe and to make proposals for improvement of the same.47 The
stated position of the Competition Commission was that the aerospace
41 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee
of the Regions-A Coherent Framework for Aerospace-A Response to the STAR
21 Report, COM(03)600 final.
42 Id
43 Id
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industry within Europe should receive supportive policies 4s to improve
its global competitiveness.49
As stated earlier, the national champion of the E.U. is the
aerospace industry. The major player in the aerospace industry within
Europe is Airbus, a maker of commercial airplanes that competes chiefly
with Boeing of the U.S.. Airbus is made up of stock ownership of two
other companies.50  The European Aeronautic and Space Company
("EADS") is the majority owner of Airbus, owning eighty percent of the
stock of Airbus. The other owner of Airbus is British Aerospace and
Marconi Electronic Systems ("BAES"), which owns the remaining
twenty percent of Airbus. Airbus is now the largest producer of
commercial planes in the world, overtaking Boeing in output.
51
As Airbus is owned by two other companies, it is important to
note who those companies are. EADS is a giant multinational company
with sales that exceeded $43 billion in 2004.52 EADS possesses several
subsidiaries, including Airbus S.A.S., Airbus North America Holdings,
Inc., and EADS North America, Inc. 3 Of course, it is not uncommon in
48 As a means to support the aerospace industry within Europe, the E.U. has
challenged one merger of American companies engaged in the aerospace
industry (Boeing/McDonnell Douglas) and blocked another (General
Electric/Honeywell).
49 See STAR 21 REPORT, supra note 40.
50 See Commission Decision of 18 October 2000 declaring a concentration to be
compatible with the common market (Case No. COMP/M.2061 - AIRBUS)
According to Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89, para. 1, 2000 O.J. (C 57). The
Commission determined thata concentration whereby European Aeronautic
Defense and Space Company acquired control of Airbus and BAES also joined
in the concentration. A merger between Aerospatial Matra of France, DASA of
Germany, and Macroni Electronic Systems created EADS, whereas a merger of
British Aerospace and Macroni Electronic Systems created BAES. The E.U.
Competition Commission approved both the BAES and EADS mergers, and the
concentration made for a combination of the interests of EADS and BAE in
Airbus. Nonetheless, the Commission found that the concentration did not
result in any anticompetitive concerns. See infra, para. 7.
51 European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company EADS N. V., HOOVER'S





the business world for ownership of a multibillion dollar multinational
company to fall to other corporations. EADS' principals, however, are
what make the company unusual. EADS formed in 2001 as a result of
the joining of several companies,54namely, Daimler Chrysler Aerospace
of Germany, Aerospatiale Matra of France, and Construcciones
Aeronautics, SA of Spain.55 Within the ownership of EADS, Daimler
Chrysler of Germany owns approximately thirty percent, and the French
Government, France-based Lagardere, BNP Pariabas and AXA together
own another thirty percent. 6 Also, SEPI, owned by Spain, owns five
and a half percent of EADS.57
The current environment within the E.U. is perfect for the
aerospace industry to be the national champion. This favorable
environment stems from a combination of the E.U.'s intent to present a
viable competitor on the world market and the E.U. Competition
Commission's statement that it is essential for the E.U. to have a strong
presence in the aerospace industry. The ownership of aerospace
companies by companies from different countries within the E.U. and, in
some instances, by actual nations such as France and Spain, also
contributes to the aerospace industry's prominence as the national
champion.
III. EFFECTS OF NATIONAL CHAMPIONS
In order to see the repercussions of the national champion
preference or a perceived national champion preference, one need look
no further than the European Union's dealings with the proposed merger
of two American companies, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. In the
Boeing McDonnell Douglas merger, the U.S. and the E.U. both accused
the other of playing to a national champion.5 8 The E.U.'s reaction to the





58 Christopher A. Whytock, A Rational Design Theory of
Transgovernrmentalism: The Case of E.U-US. Merger Review Cooperation, 23
B.U. INT'L L. J. 1, 47 (2005).
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national champion. When informed of the E.U.'s intention to block the
merger, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution by 416-2
that warned the E.U. against getting involved and interfering in a U.S.
business transaction. 59 This caused the E.U. to acquiesce to the merger.
However, the true effect of the E.U.'s preference for their national
champion manifested itself in the proposed merger of General Electric
("G.E.") and Honeywell, both of which are American companies. The
merger at least arguably failed because of the E.U.'s preference for a
national champion.
IV. PROPOSED MERGER OF GENERAL ELECTRIC AND HONEYWELL
The G.E. merger with Honeywell is perhaps the case that drew
the lines of extraterritorial jurisdiction over mergers.6 °  The
G.E./Honeywell merger was set to be a major joining of two American
companies, with the deal worth an estimated $45 billion. 61 However, the
merger did not happen because the European Commission's Directorate
General for Competition Policy at the time, Mario Monti, made the
decision that, "the merger would create or strengthen dominant positions,
leading to unfair competition. '" 62  The block of the G.E./Honeywell
merger was only the second time that Commissioner Monti blocked a
merger between two American companies.
63
The major effect of the blocking of this particular merger is that
it marked the first time that the E.U. prevented the merger of two
American companies after the merger already received clearance by the
U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. 64 The
59Id. at 48.
60 See Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 US 764, (1993) (discussing
how the United States exercised jurisdiction over an antitrust case in which
actions of a company in United Kingdom allegedly affected the United States
economy).
61 Yeo Jin Chun, The G.E.-Honeywell Merger Debacle: The Enforcement of




64 Id. at 62.
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E.U. Competition Commission concluded that the "proposed merger
would lead to the creation, or strengthening, of a dominant position in the
markets for large commercial jet aircraft engines, corporate jet aircraft
engines, avionics and non-avionics products, as well as small marine gas
turbines, causing competition in the common market to be significantly
impeded.
65
The position of the E.U. on the G.E./Honeywell merger resulted
in a rift between the U.S. and the E.U..66 The decision caused President
George W. Bush to speak out publicly against the blocking of the
G.E./Honeywell merger. In his response, Bush echoed the sentiments of
American companies by stating that he wanted U.S. companies to be
treated fairly by the authorities of the E.U. .67 The E.U. nevertheless
blocked the G.E./Honeywell merger, even though G.E. offered
concessions in an effort to bring the merger to fruition.68
As stated above, the E.U.'s decision to get involved in a merger
of two American companies was met with hostility on the part of the
U.S..
69 The U.S. not only objected to the jurisdictional concerns based
on the fact that the companies only sold goods in Europe and were not
located within the E.U., but also to the fact that the E.U.'s decision to
block the merger in the face of approval by the U.S. was motivated by
economic self-interest, rather than solid economic and antitrust analysis
and principles.7 v Mario Monti responded to Bush's push for the merger
by stating that the decision regarding the proposed merger was a matter
of law and economics and did not involve politics.
7 1
The review of the G.E./Honeywell merger by the E.U.




68 Sarah Stevens, The Increased Aggression of the EC Commission in
Extraterritorial Enforcement of the Merger Regulation and its Impact on
Transatlantic Cooperation in Antitrust, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 263,
274 (2002).
69 id.
70 Id. at 276.
71 Id.
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72
Competition Commission received notification of the proposed merger.
The Competition Commission acknowledged that both of the companies
involved in the proposed merger were American companies.73 In order
to obtain jurisdiction over the proposed merger, the Competition
Commission viewed the "community dimension" of the proposed
merger. 
74
The Competition Commission determined that jurisdiction was
proper to review the merger for several reasons. First, the two
undertakings possessed worldwide sales in excess of five billion Euros,
and second, within the E.U., the two companies had combined sales in
excess of 250 million Euros.75 Furthermore, as required by the laws of
the E.U., the companies did not receive more than two-thirds of their
aggregate Community-wide turnover within one member state or
country. 76 Based on this determination, the Competition Commission
found that the merger had a community dimension and thus, jurisdiction
was proper to review and ultimately block the proposed merger of the
two American companies.77
In reviewing a potential merger, the approval or disapproval
often hinges on how the Competition Commission defines the relevant
market of the two companies wishing to merge. It is interesting to note
that although G.E. engages in a myriad of industries, the Competition
Commission chose to define the relevant market as the aerospace and
power systems industries. 8 The Competition Commission determined
that the only overlap between the two companies was in the market for
large regional jet aircraft engines. 79  The fact the Competition
Commission chose to limit the merger's market to aerospace, rather than
consider the different industries and markets which the merger may
72 Commission Decision of 3 July 2001 declaring a concentration to be
incompatible with the common market and the EEA Agreement, 2004 (L 48) 1,







79 Id. at 11.
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affect, lends further credence to the theory that the aerospace industry is
the national champion of the E.U..
In order to review a potential merger in the aerospace market
generally, and within the jet engine market specifically, the Competition
Commission considers the geographic market to be a worldwide
market. 80  The Competition Commission's stance is that the
transportation cost of jet engines is negligible and therefore, the relevant
market is the entire world, regardless of the physical location of the
manufacturer. 8 ' In reviewing G.E.'s position within the aerospace
industry, the Competition Commission focused on the three largest
makers of jet engines in the world:82 G.E., Rolls Royce, and Pratt &
Whitney.83 Of those three makers, the second largest is Rolls Royce,
which is located in the United Kingdom.
84
In reviewing the proposed merger of G.E. and Honeywell, the
Competition Commission focused more on the competitors in the
relevant markets than on the actual competition. The Merger
Regulations of the E.U. Competition Commission state that the mergers
should be blocked if the merger will harm competition or increase a
dominant position, which is generally defined as a market share of
greater than fifty percent.85 However, the protection of competitors is in
direct opposition to the intent of antitrust laws within the U.S. as well as
within the E.U..86 Not only did the Competition Commission consider
80 Id. at 13.
81 Id.
" Id. at 15.
83 See Rolls-Royce, in HOOVERS IN-DEPTH COMPANY RECORDS, available at
http://www.hoovers.com/rolls-royce/--ID__41834--/free-co-factsheet.xhtml.
84 id.
85 See Guidelines, supra note 1. (emphasis added).
86 See THOMAS E. SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW,
POLICY AND PROCEDURE 2 (4th ed. 1999) ("The purpose of antitrust law is to
promote the goal of enhancing economic efficiency without consideration of the
sociopolitical imbalance that such a goal may create between the large
concentrated business and the small struggling competitor. Antitrust laws are
intended to protect competition, not competitors.")
324 [VOL. 14:2
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the branch of G.E. that is involved with the production of jet engines, but
it also looked at the company as a whole.
87
The Competition Commission stated that G.E. has an unmatched
88balance sheet that gives it an advantage over other companies,
especially over other manufacturers of jet engines.89 In the Competition
Commission's view, these deep pockets allow G.E. to take more risk in
product development, and that a failure in the development of a new
product will not doom the company.90 The Competition Commission
noted that within the industry of jet engine manufacturing, much time
would pass between the building of a new product and the eventual
recoupment of that money along with eventual profits. 9' The
Competition Commission further stated that G.E.'s financial strength
gives them an advantage over Pratt & Whitney and Rolls Royce.92
In evaluating the merger, the Competition Commission noted
that Rolls Royce does not possess the ability to replicate the market
strength of G.E..9  Further, the Competition Commission held that
although Rolls Royce is a "very capable supplier in the technical sense,"
it cannot be considered a credible bidder for all engines across all
markets.94 Interestingly, the expansive view of the Rolls Royce markets
stood in contrast to the narrow parameters of the Honeywell and G.E.
markets, which the Competition Commission found overlapped only in
one specific type of jet engine.
It seems the Competition Commission stepped outside logical
parameters of the evaluation of the proposed merger in order to protect
87 Decision on General Electric/Honeywell Merger, supra note 72, at 25. It is
interesting to note that in determining that G.E. has a superior position in the
aerospace industry, the Commission considered the company as a whole, but in
viewing the merger with Honeywell, the Commission seemed to disregard the











the E.U. aerospace industry. Rolls Royce was determined to be at a
competitive disadvantage against G.E. .95 According to the Competition
Commission, Rolls Royce would not be able to provide meaningful
competition with G.E. without taking significant risks that "could
jeopardize the very future of its aircraft engine activities., 96 Taking into
account a company's potential financial troubles stemming from
competition with another company is the very essence of protecting a
competitor, rather than competition.
In reviewing the proposed merger, the Competition Commission
also evaluated the position of Honeywell within the Community. The
Competition Commission stated that Honeywell was the largest
worldwide supplier of all aerospace equipment other than engines.97 The
Competition Commission noted that the competitors of Honeywell did
not possess the broad range of products that Honeywell did.98 In
considering Honeywell, the Competition Commission considered that the
merger would result in Honeywell having financial resources that
competitors of Honeywell did not have.99 The Competition Commission
stated that Honeywell had an important market position in a number of
engine accessories and controls that are essential to jet engines. 100 In the
Competition Commission's view, the merger of G.E. and Honeywell
would have created a vertically integrated relationship based on G.E.'s
position in the market.'01
In reviewing the proposed merger of G.E. and Honeywell, the
Competition Commission also expressed concerns for the UK-based
Rolls Royce and concluded that G.E. and Rolls Royce's other
competitor, Pratt & Whitney, was likely to lose some of its market share
in the jet engine market.'0 2 The Competition Commission considered the
possibility of the competitors gaining sales lost by Pratt & Whitney and
95 Id. at 40.
96 id.
9' Id. at 42. According to the Commission, the only market in which G.E. and
Honeywell overlapped was in a specific type of engine.
98 Id. at 48.
99 Id. at 54.
1oo Id.
I01 Id.
102 See id. at 65.
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stated that if G.E. were allowed to merge with Honeywell, Rolls Royce
would have less of a chance of gaining those sales because potential
purchasers would be more apt to choose the engines produced by G.E..1°3
Based on the above-mentioned reasons, the Competition
Commission issued the following conclusion regarding the proposed
merger of G.E. and Honeywell:
[I]t should be concluded that the proposed merger would
lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant
position on the markets for large commercial jet aircraft
engines, large regional jet aircraft engines, corporate jet
aircraft engines, avionics and non-avionics products, as
well as small marine gas turbine, as a result of which
effective competition in the common market would be
significantly impeded.l
0 4
It is clear from the Competition Commission's analysis that in reviewing
the proposed merger of G.E. and Honeywell, the Competition
Commission was more concerned with competitors than competition.
The Competition Commission focused heavily on the other undertakings'
ability to compete with G.E.. It is also prudent to note that Rolls Royce
was one of the competitors the Competition Commission considered in
reviewing the potential merger
1 5
V. BOEING MERGER WITH MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
Another merger within the aerospace industry that involved the
national champion of the E.U. and companies from the U.S. was the
merger of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. The Competition
Commission received notification of the proposed merger on February
18, 1997.106 After reviewing the proposed merger, the Competition
103 Id.
104 Id. at 84.
'05 The Commission agreed with most of the positions asserted by the STAR 21
Committee, of which the CEO of Rolls Royce was a part.
106 Commission Decision of 30 July 1997 declaring a concentration compatible
with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No.
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Commission decided to suspend the merger while it reviewed the
possible concentration. 107 After much publicity and review, however, the
Competition Commission finally approved the merger.'
0 8
The Competition Commission determined that the merger fell
within the scope of the Merger Regulation and had serious doubts about
the concentration's compatibility with the common market. 0 9 Both
Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, the two merging companies, were
American corporations that were publicly traded and engaged in the
business of manufacturing commercial jet airplanes." 0 The Competition
Commission determined that the merger had a community dimension;
therefore, jurisdiction to review the merger was proper."' By letter, the
Competition Commission informed the U.S. Federal Trade Commission
of its concerns regarding the proposed merger and Chairman Pitofski of
the Federal Trade Commission responded by indicating that the E.U.'s
concerns would be taken into account during the Federal Trade
Commission's review process.
12
After its review, the Federal Trade Commission unanimously approved
the merger. On July 13, 1997, the U.S. Department of Defense and U.S.
Department of Justice informed the E.U. Competition Commission of
concerns that the decision to block the merger could harm the U.S.
national defense interests and that steps to preserve McDonnell Douglas
as a stand-alone manufacturer of new aircraft would likely be
unsuccessful." 3 Moreover, in the U.S.' view, blocking the merger would
IV/M.877 - Boeing/McDonnell Douglas), 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16, 16 [hereinafter




... Id. at 17. The Commission used the same standard asserted in the
G.E./Honeywell merger, specifically, that the aerospace industry had a world-
wide effect. See Decision on General Electric/Honeywell Merger, supra note
72, at 13. Through this standard, Competition Commission jurisdiction was
proper to review the proposed mergers, even if the companies were not located
within the territory of the E.U.
112 Decision on Boeing/McDonnell Merger, supra note 106, at 17.
"3 Id. at 17-18.
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result in a loss of jobs in the U.S. and a divestiture of McDonnell
Douglas to a third party. The third party would then be motivated to
raise prices for spare parts for the McDonnell Douglas planes in service,
thereby having an anticompetitive effect." 14 After reviewing the position
of Boeing in the relevant market, the Competition Commission
determined that Boeing possessed a dominant position as a result of the
barriers to entry" 5 and Boeing's sales. 16  In the end, however, the
Competition Commission determined that the merger would not impede
the common market and approved the concentration." 
7
VI. PROCTER & GAMBLE MERGER WITH GILLETTE
Recently the E.U. Competition Commission approved the
merger of two other American companies, neither of which had any
dealings in the aerospace industry. On July 15, 2005, the Competition
Commission decided not to oppose the concentration of Procter &
Gamble and Gillette.' l8 Procter & Gamble is the number one maker of
114 Id. at 18.
"15 Id. at 24. During the Boeing McDonnell Douglas merger evaluation, Boeing
admitted that the barrier to entry in the market of manufacturing jet planes was
extremely high, with the cost of developing a new wide-body jet exceeding $10
billion.
116id.
117 Id. at 39. See also Jeffrey A. Miller, The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas
Merger: The European Commission's Costly Failure to Properly Enforce the
Merger Regulation, 22 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 359, 359 (1998). The
European Union Competition Commission approved the Boeing and McDonnell
Douglas merger despite a determination that the merger was anti-competitive in
the commercial aircraft sector. The Commission also decided to compel Boeing
into making concessions instead of blocking the merger altogether. The
Commission backtracked from the earlier position that the merger was anti-
competitive largely because of President Clinton's statements that a decision
against the proposed merger could lead the United States to either bring the
matter to the World Trade Organization or to potentially pursue its own options.
See infra p. 359.
118 Non-Opposition to a Notified Concentration (Case COMP/M.3732 - Proctor
& Gamble/Gillette), 2005 O.J. (C 239) 12.
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household products in the world," 9 with 300 brands of products available
in more than 160 countries.12  Procter & Gamble is ranked number
twenty-six on the Fortune 500, and between 2004 and 2005, the company
had world-wide sales of $56 billion. 121 Correspondingly, Gillette is the
world's number one maker of shaving supplies. 122 Gillette is ranked
number 215 on the Fortune 500,123 and in the fiscal year of 2004, Gillette
had sales just over $10 billion. 1
24
During its review of the proposed merger of Procter & Gamble
and Gillette, the Competition Commission noted previous Commission
decisions in issuing its decision. 25 The Competition Commission also
considered that conglomerate effects might come about if two companies
with large market shares in numerous, non-overlapping products decided
to merge. 26 This comparison could indeed include the blocked merger
of G.E. and Honeywell. Both Procter & Gamble and Gillette own a
considerable number of "must stock brands," specifically, brands with a
strong appeal that most retailers will stock on their shelves. 2 7 After the
merger, the companies would own 21 brands with sales of more than $1
billion per year for each brand. 28  Despite this, the Competition
Commission decided not to oppose the merger and found it to be
compatible with the common market.'
29
"9 Proctor and Gamble Company, in HOOVERS IN-DEPTH COMPANY RECORDS,
available at 2005 WLNR 17297003.
120 Id.
121 Id.




125 Commission Decision of 15 July 2005 Declaring a Concentration to be
Compatible With the Common Market (Case No IV/M.3732 - Proctor &
Gamble/Gillette) according to Council Regulation 4064/89, 110, available at
http://europa.E.U..int/eurlex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32005
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It is interesting to note that as with the denied merger of G.E.
and Honeywell, the approved merger of Procter & Gamble and Gillette
involved a merger of two gigantic companies with huge sales that were
leaders in their particular industries. Procter & Gamble is a world leader
in home products, whereas Gillette is the world leader in the market of
shaving products. It appears as though the only difference between the
two mergers is the products of the companies. The blocked merger of
G.E. and Honeywell was between companies in the aerospace industry,
which the E.U. indicated through word and deed that it would protect.
The Procter & Gamble and Gillette merger, on the other hand, fit a
similar mold but received E.U. approval, as it is of two companies in a
different industry.
VII. SUBSIDIES
Along with acting in a manner that is harmful to the competitors
of an E.U. undertaking located outside of Europe, the E.U. can also
govern in a manner that is beneficial to the maker within the E.U.. 3 °
The E.U. is on record as stating that a viable aerospace industry is
necessary to the E.U. economy and meeting the goals of the E.U..131 In
an attempt to facilitate the leading E.U. company within the aerospace
industry and its global success, the E.U. has given funds to Airbus in an
attempt to help the company compete and excel on a global level.
32
130 See Commission Decision of 25 June 1999 Declaring a Concentration to be
Compatible With the Common Market (Case No IV/M.1438 - British
Aerospace/GEC Marconi) according to Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89,
1999 O.J. (C 241) 8; Commission Decision of 20 December 2002 Declaring a
Concentration to be Compatible With the Common Market (Case No IV/M.2924
- EADS/Astrium) According to Council Regulation 4064/89, 2003 O.J. (C 117)
6; Commission Decision of 26 May 2003 Declaring a Concentration to be
Compatible With the Common Market (Case No IV/M.3156 - EADS/Astrium
(II)) according to Council Regulation 4064/89, 2004 O.J. (C 066) 5.
131 See EUROPA, AEROSPACE, at
http://europa.E.U..int/comm/enterprise/aerospace/indexen.htm (last visited
Apr. 1, 2006).
132 Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, United




Currently, Airbus owns a fifty percent share of the market of large
commercial airplanes world-wide and owns a sixty percent share of the
global order book for aircraft.
133
Over its thirty-five year history,1 34 the E.U. financed at least
partially, if not totally, every major aircraft model Airbus produced.1
35
Airbus recently received a commitment from the E.U. for $3.7 billion for
the launch of its Airbus A380.136  In all, Airbus will receive
approximately $6.5 billion in subsidies for the Airbus A380.137 Airbus is
also the maker of the Airbus A350,138 which is designed to compete
directly with the Boeing 787.139 As a part of the merger between Boeing
and McDonnell Douglas, and in order to receive E.U. approval, Boeing
was required to license to Airbus any government funded patent.1
40
Airbus has no such requirement, therefore placing Boeing at a
competitive disadvantage. 141
In addition to placing Boeing at a competitive disadvantage in its
competition with Airbus, the subsidies also violate the competition laws
of the E.U.. 142 The Competition laws of the E.U. mandate that "any aid
akesnext_stepin-airbus-wtolitigation.html [hereinafter USTR Press
Release].
133 Id.
134 Id. (explaining that the most recent incarnation of Airbus actually came about
in 2001, before Airbus was a conglomerate. The reference to the thirty-five year
history of Airbus makes reference to both versions of the company).
135 See USTR Press Release, supra note 132.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 See AIRBUs AIRCRAFT FAMILIES, INTRODUCTION TO THE ALL-NEW A350, at
http://www.airbus.com/en/aircraftfamilies/a350/index.html (last visited April 1,
2006).
139 See USTR Press Release, supra note 132.
140 id.
141 id.
142 In addition to violating the Competition Laws of the European Union, the
case can certainly be made that the subsidies paid by the countries of the E.U. to
Airbus violate the antitrust laws of the United States as well. Even though
Airbus is not an American company, the courts of the United States have
jurisdiction over the company. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509
U.S. 764, 796 (1993). It appears that both the United States government and
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granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by
favouring [sic] certain undertakings or the productions of certain goods
shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible
with the common market." 143 The E.U. competition law provides that
certain subsides are compatible with the common market; however none
of these exceptions apply to the subsidies of Airbus. 14 4  The E.U.
competition law also provides that in certain circumstances, the giving of
state aid may be compatible with the common market.145  The E.U.
Boeing could bring an action against Airbus based on Airbus's actions relative
to subsidies. The Sherman Act outlaws all contract combinations or
conspiracies in restraint of trade. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004). It is
not necessary for the two parties that are in contract or combination to be
competitors. The position could also be taken that Airbus's actions violate
Sherman Act § 2, which states that it is illegal for a company to monopolize or
attempt to monopolize. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004). Given the fact
that Airbus has Boeing as its only other competitor in the commercial aircraft
manufacturing market, and that there are tremendous barriers for new companies
to enter the market, Airbus might have the proper market power to be considered
a monopoly. Even if Airbus is not a monopoly, the company's attempt to seek
funds from the E.U. when it is already the largest company in the world in the
relevant industry could certainly be deemed an attempt by Airbus to
monopolize.
143 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
art. 87, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 1, 67, available at http://europa.E.U..int/eur-
lex/en/treaties/dat/EC_consol.pdf.(emphasis added).
144 Id. Exceptions that are compatible with the common market include:
(a) aid having a social character;
(b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters
or exceptional occurrences;
(c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal
Republic of Germany to compensate for the economic
disadvantages caused by the division of Germany.
See infra p. 330.
145 Id. . The EC Treaty states the following may be considered compatible with
the common market:
(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where
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Competition Commission could probably make the argument that the
subsidies to Airbus fall within the exception permitting state aid in some
cases. However, even though the subsidies to Airbus may not directly
violate the provisions of Article 87 of the EC Treaty, 46 the subsidies to
Airbus are in opposition to the stated Competition Commission position
on state aid.
147
Even though the E.U. gives subsidies to Airbus, the Competition
Commission recognizes that subsidies are anti-competitive. 48  The
Competition Commission stated that, "giving certain firms of products
favoured [sic] treatment to the detriment of other firms of products, state
aid seriously disrupts normal competitive forces.' 49 The Competition
Commission went on to state that because of subsidies, "the entire
market will suffer from state aid, and the general competitiveness of the
the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is
serious underemployment; (b) aid to promote the execution of
an important project of common European interest or to
remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member
State; (c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic
activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does
not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to
the common interest; (d) aid to promote culture and heritage
conservation where such aid does not affect trading conditions
and competition in the Community to an extent that is contrary
to the common interest; (e) such other categories of aid as may
be specified by decision of the Council acting by a qualified
majority on a proposal from the Commission.
See infra p. 67.
146 This is especially true because the Competition Commission would be the
entity to enforce the violation of Article 87 of the EC Treaty. Although Boeing
could bring an action against Airbus, the likelihood of success is slim as the
E.U. has a stated policy of protecting the aerospace industry and the
governments of the E.U.'s member states are the ones giving the subsidies.
source
147 EUROPA, EUROPEAN COMPETITION POLICY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW-STATE AID
CONTROL, at http://europa.E.U..int/comm/competition/state-aid/overview/ (last
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European economy is imperiled."' 150 Not only do the subsidies given to
Airbus by the E.U. and the member states of the E.U. appear to be
violating the E.U. competition policies, but they are also causing a rift
between the E.U. and the U.S..1
51
As a result of the subsidies paid to Airbus, the U.S. sought
review by the World Trade Organization and alleged that the E.U.
violated agreements between the two. 52 The U.S. alleged violations of
both the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT") and the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM").
153
GATT states in relevant part that the signatories to the agreement
seek to eliminate the adverse effects on trade in the area of civil aircraft
as a result of governmental support in aircraft development, production
and marketing. 54 Furthermore, GATT states that the signatories of the
agreement will seek to avoid the adverse effects on trade in the area of
civil aircraft that can result from governmental subsidies to the
manufacturers of civil aircraft.
155
With regards to SCM, the agreement defines a subsidy as a
financial contribution by a government or any public body of a signatory
to the SCM in which the government practice involves a direct transfer
of funds or potential of direct transfer of funds. 56 SCM also states that
15o Id.
151 In response to the subsidies given to Airbus by the E.U. and some of the
E.U.'s member states, the United States brought an action against the E.U. to the
World Trade Organization. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES-MEASURES AFFECTING TRADE IN LARGE CIVIL AREAS, at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/casese/ds326_e.htm (last visited
Apr. 1, 2006).
152 See Press Release, U.S. Requests WTO Dispute Settlement Panel Over
Airbus (May 30, 2005), available at
http://www.useu.be/Categories/AircraftSubsidies/May3005USAirbusWTO.html.
153 Id.
154 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Trade in Civil Aircraft, Apr. 12,
1979, art. 6, 31 U.S.T. 619 (1979), available at 1980 WL 309096.
155 Id.
156 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 1,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994) [hereinafter SCM Agreement], available at 1994 WL 761483.
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no signatory to the agreement should cause through subsidies adverse
effects to the interests of another signatory, such as the injury to the
domestic industry of another signatory.' 57 Based on the fact that Airbus
is now the largest airplane manufacturing company in the world
supplanting Boeing,158 it certainly appears as though the E.U. violated
SCM by granting subsidies to Airbus.
1 59
CONCLUSION
The aerospace industry is vastly different from most other
industries. Thus, to treat it as if it were the same as other industries is a
folly. Governments the world over recognize that the aerospace industry
is essential to the economy of the countries not only as it relates to the
production and sales of the product, but also to allow for the citizens to
be mobile. As the situation currently stands, governments' 60 treat the
aerospace industry as any other industry in some circumstances but not
in others. Within the U.S., although the government is not giving direct
subsidies to Boeing, it does continue to grant large government contracts
that are certainly beneficial to Boeing's profitability.1 6' The E.U.
'5 7 Id., art. 5, at 233.
'5' See Decision on Boeing/McDonnell Merger, supra note 106.
159 SCM Agreement, art. 6, at 234. A subsidy shall be actionable if "it has been
demonstrated that there has been a change in relative shares of the market to the
disadvantage of the non-subsidized like product. 'Change in relative shares of
the market' shall include any of the following situations: (a) there is an increase
in the market share of the subsidized product; (b) the market share of the
subsidized product remains constant in circumstances in which, in the absence
of subsidy, it would have declined; (c) the market share of the subsidized
product declines, but at a slower rate than would have been the case in the
absence of the subsidy." See infra at p. 234.
160 This includes the United States Federal Trade Commission, the Department
of Justice, the Trade Representative, and the Office of the President and the
European Union Competition Commission and Parliament.
161 See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Defense, Contracts (Oct. 31, 2005),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/contracts/2005/ct2OO51031.html. The
U.S. Department of Defense awards contracts benefiting Boeing. For example,
McDonnell Douglas Corp., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Boeing, in St. Louis,
Missouri,, is being awarded a $38,299,002 finn fixed price contract to exercise
336 [VOL. 14:2
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
reviews a merger of companies within the aerospace industry just as if it
were any two companies and then grants subsidies to Airbus in direct
conflict with this state of thought. Sovereigns on both sides of the
Atlantic are guilty of acting as if the aerospace industry is just another
industry and then doggedly attempting to protect individual interests.
It should be recognized that the aerospace industry is the national
champion of the E.U.. The E.U. has demonstrated this by granting
subsidies to local companies and by attempting to hinder the progress of
competitors from other countries, including the near block of the merger
of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas and the block of the merger of
General Electric and Honeywell. One should also recognize that the
aerospace industry is extremely important to the U.S. as it relates to the
overall economy and national defense.
The aerospace industry should not be painted with the broad
brush of general competition law. Both the E.U. and the U.S. should
agree as to whether subsidies to companies in the aerospace industry are
permitted. The E.U. and the U.S. should also agree on whether
prospective mergers are to be treated as other mergers and the degree of
compliance required for relevant merger guidelines. Because these
actions do not occur within a vacuum, the most prudent course of action
would be to recognize that aerospace is different and should be treated as
such to avoid further complications, threats, gamesmanship, and surprise
results. Based on the tremendous barriers to entry within the aerospace
industry,1 62 the possibility of new competitors within the aerospace
industry is unlikely. Governments should understand that not all laws
apply perfectly in all situations. As such, the respective governments
should promulgate separate competition, or antitrust, laws for the
industry to relieve confusion and to implement a system that makes sense
for the industry.
Lot 2 option for the small diameter bomb increment I (fixed/stationary target)
low rate initial production for munitions, carriages, and associated trainers and
technical support. McDonnell Douglas Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary of
Boeing in Long Beach, California, is being awarded a $22,000,000 time and
material contract modification. See infra.
162 See Decision on Boeing/McDonnell Merger supra note 106.
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